Respuesta :
On a warm late-May afternoon, I took a taxi to the outskirts of the Russian capital to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, known by its Russian acronym, Mgimo. Flags marked the entrance to the campus, a stately Soviet behemoth with a hammer-and-sickle on a panel above the doors. Students in skinny jeans, button-down shirts and thick black glasses gathered in gaggles by the flagpoles, checking their phones and chatting. I signed in as a visitor at the security desk and wandered past a buzzing cafeteria, into the institute’s gift shop, with its rainbow of sweatshirts, coffee mugs and notebooks emblazoned with the Mgimo logo.
Since 1944, Mgimo has trained legions of diplomats; its 53 language offerings — including Afrikaans, Amharic and Vietnamese — serve as a reminder of the Soviet Union’s global ambitions. As much as ninety-five percent of Russia’s foreign ministry is made up of Mgimo alumni, while those who graduate with honors and pass a language test become attachés, complete with a green diplomatic passport. They are then sent forth, as Vladimir Putin himself put it, “to protect Russian interests” in the rest of the world. Alumni include the president of Azerbaijan, the foreign-affairs ministers of Slovakia and Mongolia and Russia’s own foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who regularly returns to give the commencement address.
Mgimo is run by the foreign ministry, so Andrey Baykov, its vice rector, is a hybrid — part academic, part representative of Russian diplomacy. I asked him a question that I would spend a long time trying to understand: What does Russia really want?
From behind a large dark wooden desk, Baykov — young and fresh-faced, dressed smartly in a suit and slender tie — answered in nearly flawless British-accented English: “To be an autonomous player, to uphold its identity of a great power which is strategically independent.” Russia, he explained, did not want to dismantle the trans-Atlantic world order by splintering NATO and demolishing the European Union, as was frequently suggested by the Western press using headlines like “Is Putin’s Master Plan Only Beginning?” (Vanity Fair); “The Dark Arts of Foreign Influence-Peddling” (The Atlantic); “Why Russia Is Using the Internet to Undermine Western Democracy” (Slate). Instead, he spoke about the importance of Russia’s national identity and its territorial sovereignty.
Since 1944, Mgimo has trained legions of diplomats; its 53 language offerings — including Afrikaans, Amharic and Vietnamese — serve as a reminder of the Soviet Union’s global ambitions. As much as ninety-five percent of Russia’s foreign ministry is made up of Mgimo alumni, while those who graduate with honors and pass a language test become attachés, complete with a green diplomatic passport. They are then sent forth, as Vladimir Putin himself put it, “to protect Russian interests” in the rest of the world. Alumni include the president of Azerbaijan, the foreign-affairs ministers of Slovakia and Mongolia and Russia’s own foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who regularly returns to give the commencement address.
Mgimo is run by the foreign ministry, so Andrey Baykov, its vice rector, is a hybrid — part academic, part representative of Russian diplomacy. I asked him a question that I would spend a long time trying to understand: What does Russia really want?
From behind a large dark wooden desk, Baykov — young and fresh-faced, dressed smartly in a suit and slender tie — answered in nearly flawless British-accented English: “To be an autonomous player, to uphold its identity of a great power which is strategically independent.” Russia, he explained, did not want to dismantle the trans-Atlantic world order by splintering NATO and demolishing the European Union, as was frequently suggested by the Western press using headlines like “Is Putin’s Master Plan Only Beginning?” (Vanity Fair); “The Dark Arts of Foreign Influence-Peddling” (The Atlantic); “Why Russia Is Using the Internet to Undermine Western Democracy” (Slate). Instead, he spoke about the importance of Russia’s national identity and its territorial sovereignty.
As a nuclear power, Putin and Russia is as much a threat as any other country looking to expand its interests. While Putin May have been foolish annexing Crimea and attempts with the Ukraine, the West is just as foolish making overtures to former Soviet satellites to join either NATO or the EU. There is no doubt that Putin is aggressive in defense and pursuit of his country’s interests, but that is why it is incumbent on the West not to inflame tensions by trying to influence the direction of former Soviet territories. Neither side trusts the other, which is why both sides need to mind their own business.
